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Abstract 
This paper studies the most relevant literature on firms’ capital structure, in general, 
and Small and Medium Enterprises, in particular. Evidencing that SMEs’ financing 
needs to evolve with their age, literature notes that failures in this market stem 
generally from a shortage in capital supply and from the extreme degree of opacity 
which characterizes young and small corporations. The forthcoming Basel III 
regulations will strengthen the future banking environment but probably affect even 
more financing to small businesses. Given that the imperfections of this market are 
not only present in periods of economic turmoils but also on a structural basis, 
finding ways to enhance SMEs’ transparency, and designing instrument to reduce 
dependence from bank credit, should be a priority for future actions undertaken by 
practitioners and regulators. Following the effective examples of the Indian SMEs 
Rating Agency, of the Korean corporate bonds market and of the growing 
phenomenon of crowdfunding, this work analyzes their pros and cons as well as their 
potential to become worldwide industry standards. 
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1. Introduction 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) can be seen as those corporations too small 
to obtain access to traditional banking channels but too big to access microfinance. 
Traditional theories have described these companies’ financing choices as a function 
of costs and benefits connected to each source of capital, as well as in relation to 
their age and maturity. However, due to their high informational opacity, SMEs may 
encounter severe difficulties in signaling the quality of their businesses. Several 
instruments have been designed to overcome these difficulties, but especially during 
economic turmoils, even those tools might lead to sub-optimal financing equilibria if 
the supply side of the channel is blocked. The short-term impact of a credit crunch 
highly reduces the effectiveness of traditional SMEs financing channels, leaving 
those companies with an insufficient spectrum of funding opportunities. Up-to-date 
frameworks, while recognizing the relevance of these issues, still have not agreed on 
which concrete tools can be designed to help SMEs overcome the impasse. 
This work will start by examining the Demand side of the framework, trying to 
understand how the focus of classic theories, namely the Pecking Order Theory, the 
Trade-Off Model and the Market Timing Theory has shifted during the last years. Up 
to today, these theories have received mixed empirical evidence, and most of firms’ 
financing criteria remain still unexplained. Secondly, I will study in detail how SMEs 
define their capital structure. The most relevant theoretical contributions evidence 
that small businesses’ financing evolves with their age and with the reduction of their 
informational opacity. In practice, SMEs tend to rely mostly on private capital 
contributions, and seldom access capital markets due to the lack of verifiable data 
about their quality. However, several are the instruments practitioners have identified 
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to increase the ability of SMEs to establish financing relations: among them, the use 
of personal guarantees as collateral, the definition of appropriate covenants and 
maturities and the creation of personal relations with capital lenders seem to be the 
most widely used. Then, with a solid theoretical background, the attention will move 
to the Supply side of financing, to investigate the role intermediaries, and lenders in 
general, have in periods of credit tightening. Furthermore, I will study why, in 
Europe, the provisions of Basel II have not worked and how Basel III will deploy its 
impact in the years to come. The biggest impact of the forthcoming regulations will 
likely be deployed over small financing institutions and, consequently, on SMEs. In 
Europe, the creation of a Small Business Act posed the ground for the definition of 
less burdensome regulatory requirements for SMEs. To understand if the capital 
structure landscape will change in the future in the light of the new legislations, the 
last section of this study investigates whether there is room for the adoption of new 
financial instruments to serve SMEs’ needs, and what could be effective ways to 
increase their informational transparency. Creating a Rating Agency dedicated to 
SMEs, and requiring each small corporation to obtain a credit rating may be the key 
to reduce SMEs’ opacity and to pave the way for their entrance in the corporate bond 
market, today practically inaccessible. The development of SMEs’ dedicated stock 
markets, and the diffusion of the instrument of crowdfunding, may add extra steps in 
the classical small businesses’ financing cycle. 
2. Traditional capital structure frameworks 
In this section I will briefly present the most widely accepted theories of capital 
structure, emphasizing on their indications for SMEs’ financing. According to the 
original specification of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the Trade-Off Model predicts 
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that firms’ capital structure is defined by a trade-off between debt’s benefits and 
costs. The “tax-bankruptcy trade-off” approach links the benefits of interests’ tax 
deductibility with the costs of bankruptcy, whereas the “agency” perspective 
describes extra debt as a tool to control managers’ behavior given the threat of 
bankruptcy if debt is not repaid. The Pecking Order Theory, as described by Myers 
and Majluf (1984), states that the first financial decision to be made by a corporation 
concerns its ability to support business with cash flows generated from internal 
activities. Should the firm not find enough retained funds to finance positive NVP 
projects, the recourse to external funding may become necessary, in the forms of debt 
and equity. At last, the Market Timing Theory observes that managers will use those 
financial tools that appear to be more favorable in the moment they need financing: 
they will issue equity following a general stock price increase, and look for debt 
financing when interest rates are low. Firms may raise funds even if unnecessary, if 
conditions appear extremely favorable, as well as defer financing if none of the 
markets appears attractive.  
These theoretical works have so far received mixed theoretical evidence. For 
example, in their comprehensive work, Frank and Goyal (2009) study the impact of a 
series of factors that previous theoretical literature deemed critical in the 
understanding of firms’ capital structure. They find that those firms which i) belong 
to an industry in which the median firms displays a high leverage, ii) have lower 
market-to-book ratio, iii) have more tangible assets, iv) have lower profitability, v) 
are large and vi) compete in a high-inflation environment, tend to display a higher 
leverage. Five out of these six factors behave as predicted by the static trade-off 
theory; the behavior of profits, instead, is consistent only with dynamic trade-off 
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models in which leverage is left free to move and adjusted only if it goes over a 
certain threshold. On the other hand, even though the pecking order theory succeeds 
in predicting correctly the effects of profits, it does not manage to explain many 
firms’ financing decisions. Market timing theory, at last, is too little developed to be 
considered a reliable predictor of firm’s behavior. For the interest of this work, what 
classical theories predict is that the smaller and the less tangible a firm is, the lower 
the degree of indebtedness one should expect to see. Graham and Leary (2011) 
strongly believe that none of the extant theories has ever been able to explain 
thoroughly the observable heterogeneities in firms’ financing decisions. Even though 
the most recent literature used other criteria to explain traditional theories’ failure 
(refined fundamental variables’ measurement, higher consideration for non-financial 
stakeholders, more prominent role to capital supply and financial contracting), it is 
widely agreed that that it may be too costly to frequently optimize capital structure, 
thus not allowing for the observation of significant shifts in financing decisions. 
3. SMEs financing 
Among the unanswered questions in literature, this work attempts to shed more light 
to the supply side of financing and to financial contracting as drivers of SMEs’ 
finding decisions. Up-to-date studies only explained a portion of firms’ financing 
behaviors. SMEs represent the bulk of developed economies, both in terms of 
employment and turnover. Due to their characteristics, they are also the most 
exposed entities to economic fluctuations. To survive the effects of financial 
turmoils, they shall build a scrupulous knowledge of their financing opportunities. A 
large enough portfolio of alternative tools would allow them to finance their 
activities by molding their liability side regardless of supply shortages. 
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3.1 Sources of Small Business Finance 
The fundamental characteristic of small firms in the eyes of financing markets is 
their high degree of informational opacity. The contracts they stipulate are usually 
kept private. They seldom access public markets. And most of them do not keep 
“standard” financial statements. Absent easily accessible data, financial 
intermediaries find it often impossible to exercise their usual screening and 
monitoring functions. If intermediaries mainly collect information about customers, 
evaluate their quality, tailor contracts to their characteristics and assess ex-post 
compliance to contractual terms, SMEs may encounter difficulties in signaling their 
quality and hence to build financing relationships due to their lack of transparency. 
The most prominent theoretical work in SMEs literature, written by Berger and Udell 
in 1998, points out that SMEs financing decisions depend mainly on their sector of 
activity and growth cycle. SMEs have financing needs and preferences that evolve as 
the firm grows and becomes more transparent. For the majority of small businesses, 
different capital structures may be optimal at a certain stage of the cycle, but less 
effective in others. Most small businesses have their financing needs guaranteed by 
personal finances of the owners or by other “insiders”. The first projects of a young 
startup will likely be financed by a mix of insider finance and angel financing: with 
the former the authors refer to equity funding provided by the funders or by their 
families or friends; instead, “angels” are usually defined as wealthy individuals that, 
in an informal manner, invest huge amount of money in exchange of a part of the 
company’s stock. At this point, the business idea may still be at an embryonic stage, 
and the company’s assets mainly intangible. Later on, as a business plan is developed 
and the product tested, intermediated forms of equity financing take over to expand 
8 
 
the company’s scale, mainly in the form of private equity and venture capital; in the 
meanwhile, the firm will also heavily rely on trade credit, i.e. delays of payments, in 
the settlement of deals with suppliers. In addition to private equity, SMEs external 
funding is provided by private debt suppliers, rather than by public markets. As the 
firm grows, SMEs become more tangible and increase their ability to pledge their 
possessions as collateral, so eventually manage to access financial institutions’ funds. 
The biggest part of the external debt financing is provided through lines of credit and 
short-term loans; life-insurance companies, mezzanine debt funds, credit cards, 
leasing and factoring companies share the remaining (Berger and Udell, 1998; Ayadi, 
2005). Nevertheless, previous theoretical and empirical works have demonstrated 
that the amount of external debt financing is much more relevant for small firms than 
it could be expected under the “tangibility” hypothesis1
                                                          
1 See for example Berger and Udell (1998) for a theoretical framework and Graham and Leary (2011) 
for empirical findings. 
. Indeed, in the moment 
entrepreneurs use their personal belongings to guarantee firm’s loans, part of 
“external” financing becomes somehow “internal”, and personal relationships 
between local bank branches and individual entrepreneurs become more valuable 
than physical collateral. Thus, if external financing may even be anticipated to the 
firms’ earliest stages, the “growth cycle” paradigm may be seen a simplifying 
assumption of SMEs. Moreover, the fact that growing small firms tend to obtain 
external equity before external debt seems to be evidence against the traditional 
Pecking Order Theory. Berger and Udell (2003) point at the existence of a significant 
moral hazard problem for small firms as a plausible reason for this fact – external 
debt suppliers will never finance small entrepreneurs unless risk can be shared 
among several individuals (i.e. several equity owners). 
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In absence of tools to increase SMEs transparency, banks cannot trust their alleged 
quality and may be obliged to increase the cost to obtain financing. However, small 
firms and financial intermediaries do have a series of instruments to reduce the 
informational opacity problem2. As verified empirically by Berger and Udell (2003), 
these include, in detail: a) the use of tangible collateral and personal guarantees, 
given that a financial intermediary can better assess the value of the pledged asset 
rather than of the whole firm on a continuous basis3
3.2 Constraints to SMEs bank financing 
; b) the application of strict debt 
covenants and shorter maturities on contracts for younger and riskier firms; c) the 
use of loan commitments (i.e. lines of credit) to cover short-term needs and be 
activated over time, unless the firm demonstrates a severe and identifiable financial 
deterioration, or if found in breach of covenants; d) the refinement of day-by-day 
contact between borrower and supplier (relationship lending) to create a wide 
database of soft and hard data about the entrepreneur, the business and the 
environment in which it operates. All these instruments surely represent useful 
approaches to sustain financing relationships, but might eventually become 
unfeasible (or even counterproductive) if the firm has no tangible assets not pledge as 
collateral, if the contracts are designed too strictly or if a single banking relationship 
leads to exploitation or if the institution has supply shortages. 
The phenomenon of SMEs being subject to financial constraints is at the core of the 
most up-to-date literature. Several surveys on small enterprises4
                                                          
2 As already highlighted in the first part of this work, these same tools, belonging to the category of 
financial contracting instruments, have been identified by Graham and Leary (2011) as reasons for the 
failure of classical capital structure frameworks in explaining firms’ financing heterogeneity 
 confirm the 
3 See Berger and Udell (1998). 
4 See European Central Bank (2007). 
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perceived existence of constraints as one of the biggest issues small businesses face 
in their activity. In perfect capital markets, investment decisions should not depend 
on funds’ availability, but rather on the quality of the projects to be financed. Instead, 
what happens in reality is that, even without business-related reasons, many small 
firms face disproportionate costs of borrowing (in terms of fees and interest rates) 
which cut them off from the external debt financing channel. 
The ability and willingness of SMEs’ lenders to supply debt financing, as noted, is 
mostly affected by small firms’ informational opacity. Academics have identified 
several factors influencing the supply of credit to small businesses; among them, as 
described by Hackbarth et al. (2006), the most relevant factor is represented by the 
impact of Macroeconomic Factors. According to them, macroeconomic conditions 
have a strong impact on credit risk, on firms’ financing decisions and on optimal 
leverage. Their model predicts that enterprises should restrain from adjusting their 
capital structure during recessions, but do it rapidly during booms, to benefit from 
more accommodating economic conditions. SMEs, however, have limited ability to 
modify their capital structure at will, but rather depend on suppliers’ ability to 
provide them with capital.   
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy, which is triggered in reaction to 
any economic shock, operates to a large extent through the banking channel5
                                                          
5 See Gertler and Gilchrist (1991) and Dolignon and Rogers (2010). 
. If so, 
macroeconomic events either reduce banks’ reserves and thus the supply of credit 
(“bank lending view”), or reduce the value of assets to be pledged as collateral 
through higher interest rates (“balance sheet view”). Real and financial shocks, as 
well as changes in the governmental or regulatory frameworks, are likely to wield 
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their strongest impact over small firms, the most vulnerable actors in the business 
environment. As a response to worsening macroeconomic conditions, distressed 
banks attempt to reduce their risk exposure by drastically cutting their supply of 
credit to small firms, relatively riskier that bigger enterprises, with the aim of 
rebuilding their balance sheets and comply to regulatory provisions. 
The process of adjusting towards the stringent Basel III requirements, and the 
combined deterioration of governments’ financial positions6
4. Factors affecting the supply side of capital structure 
, are posing a heavy 
burden on the banking sector and on the functioning of traditional financing 
channels. The credit crunch of the early 90s in Asia and the US led to similar 
problems for SMEs that previous regulation did not manage to solve. The next 
chapter of this work will illustrate the evolution of the most important rules on 
capital requirements, verifying also empirically the extent to which the recent credit 
crunch and regulatory changes affected SMEs access to financing.  
The classic capital structure literature assumes that firms, absent supply constraints, 
can borrow as much debt as they will, setting their desired leverage ratio, as long as 
their debt capacities have not been met. Whenever the net benefit of raising debt 
increases (higher tax shield, lower financial distress costs), firms act regardless of 
supply conditions and access the debt channel. Demand seems to be the only variable 
influencing changes in firms’ capital structure. Nevertheless, whenever a financial 
turmoil imposes constraints over the ability of financial intermediaries to lend 
resources to companies, the supply side of financing gains a fundamental role. As 
described by Faulkender and Petersen (2005), if a firm’s bank suffers an external 
                                                          
6 See ECB Bank Lending Survey (2012). 
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shock to its capital, independent from demand, this shock is likely to reverse its 
effects also on the financing firm. SMEs tend to establish a direct connection with a 
single banking entity, usually on a territorial or reputational basis, and cannot easily 
move to private to public debt markets because of informational opacity. Hence, a 
shock to the banking system will have an even more severe impact on their financing 
than a shock on the public bond market. Even though SME banking is considered 
one of the sectors with the highest growth perspectives7
4.1 The impact of regulation 
, there are some external 
constraints hampering the willingness of banks to access this market. Financial 
crises, and their consequences, represent the most relevant factor to consider.  
The recent global financial turmoil wiped off the value of banks’ balance sheets and 
caused the liquidation or nationalization of many credit institutions. Those that 
survived, bogged down by flat growth perspectives, did so at the expense of severe 
post-crisis distress due to weakened capital, reduced investor confidence and tougher 
rules on capital requirements. All these reasons on one hand hampered banks' 
capacity (and willingness) to lend money to businesses, especially to smaller and 
riskier corporations, and on the other hand increased their operational costs in the 
process of restoring confidence and complying with the new stringent provisions of 
Basel III. Through the traditional channels, firms ended up paying more-for-less 
given that, to counterbalance their constraints, banks raised lending interest rates and 
fees, and reduced the supply of capital. Financing a firm signals to the market that 
the company has solid financial perspectives, and that there is a high probability that 
it will honor the debt. When banks step back and stop supplying credit, there is less 
                                                          
7 See IFC (2010), The SME Banking Knowledge Guide, for a thorough analysis of the topic. 
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information in the market and this leads to higher costs for borrowers. The 
interesting question is to study how this phenomenon affects firms’ financing 
choices, and to what extent it depends on regulatory changes. 
4.2 The road to Basel III 
By raising capital requirements for banking institutions, the new regulatory 
framework aims at strengthening the financial stability of the economy and at 
restoring the confidence of all economic actors. It is likely that, at least in the short-
term, the new stringent requirement will mostly affect the smallest financial 
institutions, whose business is strictly bound to small and medium enterprises. 
However, the analysis of the provisions of the new Basel Capital Accord requires 
some considerations on its predecessors, Basel I and II, whose shortcomings 
prompted the definition of the new criteria, which are more stringent than before. 
Developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1992, the rules of 
Basel I were designed with the objective of requiring banks to keep sufficient capital 
to absorb eventual losses without causing systemic problems and, furthermore, to 
create global regulatory standards. Basel II, released in 2004, dealt with a wide array 
of regulatory and supervisory issues that its forerunner left unresolved, including 
accounting standards, liquidity requirements and risk management criteria. Its main 
principle, the “first pillar”, defined a minimum “regulatory capital” to buffer 
unexpected losses with a complex system of asset risk weighting8
                                                          
8The three main sources of risk that are identified are credit risk, operational risk and market risk. 
Banks can choose between a fixed-weights simplified approach (for smaller institutions), the 
“standardized approach” (risk weights based on external rating assessments) or the “Internal Rating 
Based” approach (rating produced internally). 
. The second pillar 
aimed at stimulating banks to refine their risk-management techniques under a strict 
supervision of national authorities. The last pillar required banks to disclose all 
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relevant information that the market may consider necessary to evaluate banks’ 
activities and risk profiles, quantitatively and qualitatively. The aim of these rules 
was to help banks absorb unexpected losses such as those that normally occur during 
a financial crisis. The recent financial turmoil, however, evidenced that the Basel II 
accord was still characterized by severe drawbacks which hampered its functioning. 
Among the most important shortcomings, academics and institutions9
4.3 The New Basel accord 
 underlined 
that: A) Quantitatively, the capital requirements were inadequate (i.e. too low) to 
tolerate the huge losses incurred during the toughest crisis since the Great 
Depression; qualitatively, they were not clearly defined (unclear and inconsistent 
definitions). B) Risk-weighting formulas used excessive simplifying hypotheses; C) 
Too much freedom was left on assets’ risk-weighting, fundamental to the assessment 
of counterparty risk; rating agencies proved to be too exposed to potential conflicts 
of interest (reducing the reliability of their evaluations); D) Capital requirements 
were clearly pro-cyclical, overestimating risks in bad periods and underestimated 
them in good times; E) Incentives to securitization, which was misused to remove 
assets from balance sheet to reduce risk-weighting, allowed banks to bypass the rules 
and reduce their capital requirements, rather than to enhance liquidity. 
The new Basel III rules aim at resolving the previously cited drawbacks, mainly by 
raising capital requirement ratios and by designing instruments to contrast the pro-
cyclicality of Basel II provisions. According to Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 
(2010), four are the targets that the new rules aim at reaching: 1) Raising the quality, 
consistency and transparency of the capital base by reforming the criteria for the 
                                                          
9 See Blundell-Wignall, A. and Atkinson, P. (2010) for a comprehensive review. 
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definition of capital requirements; 2) Enhancing risk coverage, trying to capture both 
on- and off-balance sheet risks, to remove pro-cyclicality connected to volatility-
based risk inputs, to penalize increased counterparty risk and to promote “good” risk 
taking; 3) Introducing a target leverage ratio, with the intention to avoid excessive 
leverage and subsequent excessive deleverage in crisis situations; 4) Attenuating the 
cyclicality of capital requirements by using forward-looking metrics (stressing 
expected losses rather than incurred) and by promoting the accumulation of extra 
“capital buffers” over those requested by law.  
In this context, indeed very interesting and potentially effective seems to be the 
creation of capital buffers to be accumulated in periods of distress and to be accessed 
should banks’ capital ratios fall below a given threshold. In addition to that, as 
regards point 2), the new rules increase the risk-weighting attached to off-balance 
sheet items to counteract the phenomenon according to which banks, under Basel II, 
used securitization as a tool to reduce the burden of capital requirements. 
Nevertheless, the same authors underline that several problems that had been spotted 
with previous legislations still have not been solved. Namely, little attention (if none) 
seems to have been given to asset concentration in portfolios (risk weights are still 
linear to facilitate simplicity) and to alternative risk factors (the model still uses a 
single global credit risk factor). Moreover, the imposition of a leverage ratio will not 
stop the phenomenon under which banks, by shifting “promises” to entities with 
alternative regulatory and tax treatments in the banking environment, elude the risk-
weighting system and expand their leverage at will, as they did in the recent financial 
crisis. Should these issues not be faced in the near future, establishing criteria to 
penalize this regulatory arbitrage, banks will keep tending towards lower weighted 
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assets and to transfer “promises” outside the banking system, creating the basis for 
new bubbles and crises. However, the implementation timeline for the new rules is 
voluntarily loose, to avoid posing excessive weight on an economic environment that 
is slowly recovering from the 2007 crisis. The application of the new rules will start 
in January 2013, and banks will have until 2019 to fine-tune their balance sheets to 
the stricter requirements. However, at least in the short-term, the most leveraged and 
small banks, thus the ones with lower capital ratios, may be forced to reduce their 
lending activity, which is likely to worsen financing conditions for startups and 
SMEs. Due to their size and scarce resources, in relation to bigger companies, SMEs 
are those that suffer the most from the costs of stricter regulations. 
4.4 The Small Business Act 
In this context, potentially disruptive for smaller companies, the European 
Commission recently developed further measures aimed at facilitating SME’s access 
to capital markets. Recognizing the prominent role of SMEs in the European 
economic environment, regulators and Member States defined in the so-called 
“Small Business Act” a comprehensive policy framework to serve as guideline for 
National and Community rules, with the objective of stimulating growth, job creation 
and financial stability. Among its several sections, this piece of regulation gives 
interesting insights also in the area of financial structure, guiding future regulatory 
changes towards the simplification and facilitation of mechanisms to access capital. 
With the support of Member States, the Commission created an environment through 
which European SMEs will 1) benefit from strengthened loan guarantee schemes; 2) 
have easier access to EU funds; 3) increase their informational transparency and 4) 
enjoy a higher intellectual property protection. Each State will work to speed up its 
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internal bureaucratic procedures, reducing the steps required to access EU funds and 
facilitating the dialogue between firms and authorities. In particular, whenever a new 
rule might be able to pose a disproportionate burden on SMEs’ ability to obtain 
financing, each company may require to: i) be exempted from certain obligations; ii) 
temporarily reduce tax payments or fees; iii) receive direct financial aid to cover high 
fixed costs; iv) benefit from simplified reporting obligations. Even though the impact 
of the new stringent capital requirements is likely to wield its strongest effect on 
small firms’ financing ability, there seems to exist some legislative margin (at least 
in Europe) to design flexible measures aimed at sustaining SMEs financial survival. 
4.5 Current lending situation 
The most recent ECB Bank Lending Survey (BLS), reporting the situation at the 1st 
of February of 2012, indicates that most of European banks are currently in an 
ongoing process of capital reinforcement, as a response to the imminent introduction 
of the widely analyzed Basel III capital requirements. Surveyed banks pointed at the 
weak European economic outlook and the sovereign debt crisis as the main reasons 
for the net tightening of credit standards; in particular, short- and long-term loans to 
SMEs decreased by 28% in the last quarter of 2011, following a deteriorating trend 
that lasted all over 2011. As a result, on average banks increased margins on loans, 
increased fees, increased collateral requirements and reduced the size of their loans. 
Even though it is projected for 2012 that this process will likely affect more large 
than small corporations, the picture for SMEs is definitely rough. 
5. Enhancing SMEs liquidity 
Studying ways to foster SMEs’ access to funding implies accepting that either 
current instruments are not qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient, or that, if 
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existent, they are not adequate to help small firms overcome their financing 
constraints. If the traditional framework, according to which SMEs financing needs 
evolve according to their age and growth cycle, seems to hold in “normal 
conditions”, empirical evidence (in terms of high failure rate of SMEs during periods 
of crisis) seems to confirm there exists a gap which can be filled by the introduction 
of a set of new tools. This financing gap can be closed if both governments and 
private institutions, in accordance with extant legislations, design specific actions 
and systems to be deployed, in a joint effort, to enhance SMEs’ market liquidity10
The most compelling challenge for regulators and governments is definitely to 
increase the transparency of small businesses. Lowering SMEs’ informational 
opacity would be the key to enhance financial institutions’ ability to scrutinize them 
and establish lending relationships. A comprehensive assessment of extant proposals 
for alternative financing opportunities seems to be absent in up-to date theoretical 
works; the following paragraphs, stemming from the analysis of isolated best-
practices, will value their potential of adoption on a more widespread basis. 
.  
5.1 Rating for SMEs 
Faulkender and Petersen (2005) verified empirically that firms with a higher 
tangibility have a higher chance to obtain a credit rating. Those firms, usually 
mature, stable and with a wide track record, will have easier access to public debt 
markets and, thus, will be able to reach a higher degree of indebtedness. Whenever 
markets are characterized by severe financing shortages, having the possibility to 
choose among several sources of capital is of the utmost importance.    
                                                          
10 See IFC (2010). 
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Obtaining a credit rating is usually considered a too expensive and burdensome 
practice for a SME to be undertaken. However, given the notorious problems they 
face when raising funds, approaching a rating agency may be represent a viable 
solution even for small businesses. Surprisingly, nowadays an example of a well-
functioning rating system for SMEs can be found only in India. There, a restricted 
number of agencies11
                                                          
11 Among all, CRISIL and SMERA are the most influential players. See www.crisil.com and 
www.smera.in for the details of their offers. 
 built over time relationships with local banks in order to offer 
significantly lower interest rates on loans to their rated clients. Those institutions 
fulfill the typical tasks of a rating agency but in a SMEs’ environment, assessing the 
stability, health and riskiness of a firm in order to evaluate its ability to honor future 
financial obligations. The key aspect of their evaluation method, and which 
differentiates it to the common approach used for large corporations, lies in the fact 
that they use a turnover-based fee structure (fees are proportional to the size of the 
business), and that each firm is evaluated relatively to a group of similar-sized 
companies. While the latter does not represent alone such a breakthrough feature, the 
combination with the former creates a rating process which does not weigh 
excessively on the firm’s finances (being it proportioned to the dimension of the 
business), and that fairly evaluates each firm according to the characteristics of the 
sector it belongs to. Moreover, given that these ratings remain valid just for a year 
and can be easily renewed upon the payment of an appropriate fee, those SMEs 
willing to access public markets will have their creditworthiness frequently checked, 
further strengthening personal relationships and triggering a mechanism to enhance 
public transparency. At last, it is worth to note that the Indian Government sponsors 
SMEs’ rating by providing a one-time subsidy to cover all the process’ expenses. 
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If a light evaluative system is set up to assess SMEs’ creditworthiness, and if 
Governments step in to support the process, it is in the best interest of each small 
firm to obtain a credit rating. Such a system would not rely exclusively on scarce and 
often incomplete “hard” data. Instead, by combining an evaluation of one-year 
financial data and of “soft” data, this tool would help overcoming some of the 
problems identified with Basel II, still not fully solved by the upcoming reform. 
When sovereign debt crises increase attention over public spending, and with States 
struggling to provide financial aid to SMEs with their limited resources, such a 
system would help Governments nurture the small businesses environment in a direct 
and effective manner, employing public finances in a transparent way.  
Ascertained the ability of this instrument to shed light on a firm’s characteristics and 
to enhance its transparency, it is difficult to understand why a SMEs Rating Agency 
has never been established neither in Europe nor in the US. In the context of reaching 
an always better assessment of SMEs’ credit risk, as promised by Basel III, the 
creation of such an institution would definitely represent an effective complement to 
the traditional approaches. The creation of a database of SMEs ratings would spread 
information in today’s scattered SMEs market, broadening the chance of finding 
potential investors. There is room for further discussion in the future: a proposal of 
reform of the forthcoming regulatory framework may define SMEs’ rating as the 
fundamental tool to ease information asymmetries afflicting SMEs’ funding. 
5.2 SMEs Corporate Bonds and the role of Securitization 
In the sector of debt financing, it is universally recognized that SMEs tend to rely 
excessively on bank loans and that one of the main reasons of small businesses’ 
failures lies in the absence of loans availability during crises. Even though many 
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have been the attempts to reduce the dependence from bank intermediation in favor a 
more complete access to capital markets, the high riskiness and informational opacity 
of SMEs appear as difficult obstacles to overcome. In addition to that, due to the high 
fixed costs connected to the issuance of public bonds, as well as to the minimum size 
required for the offer to be marketable, SMEs have always been considered 
unsuitable to access this market. The issuance of SMEs’ bonds would be labeled as 
“junk” and appear today, in the light of the recent scandals, highly unattractive to the 
public of investors. Given that Basel III requirements will increase the burden for 
banks financing risky SMEs, a well designed access to the bond market appears as a 
potential way out. Unlike bank loans, which create a binding relationship with a 
single financing entity, corporate bonds allow firms to raise money from a 
differentiated multitude of investors. If most of those investors are generally 
represented by wealthy individuals, small businesses would even find in angels the 
natural recipients of a bond offer, but could also call on the generalized community 
of non-sophisticated investors willing to diversify their portfolios. 
As reported by Park et al. (2008), the Korean Government designed an instrument 
which contributed to the strong development of the local SMEs environment during 
the last decade, as a response to the crisis that hit the Asian market in the 90s. The 
Primary Collateralized Bond Obligation (P-CBO) program, which started in 1999, 
used the instrument of securitization to eliminate liquidity constraints in small 
businesses financing. Being asset-backed securities, P-CBOs are bonds sold by a 
Special Purpose Vehicle and whose underlying assets are represented by a pool of 
SMEs’ corporate bonds. Those securities are “elaborated” by the intervention of 
external “credit enhancers” (banks, insurance companies, credit guarantee funds) and 
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evaluated by an external rating agency, and usually sold in different tranches with 
different quality. Omitting the details of the product, it is worth to underline that in 
the way it is designed, a P-CBO manages to pool together a wide variety of SMEs’ 
bonds, characterized by different riskiness, and therefore reduces the aggregate risk 
of default. If a single company has a too high credit risk, a pool of different SMEs 
diversifies away most of idiosyncratic risk and may eventually become an attractive 
and remunerative investment in an investor’s portfolio.  
The reliability of rating agencies, which have the fundamental role of certifying the 
quality of the issuance, has reduced drastically during the recent financial crisis. Also 
in this context, a dedicated SMEs Rating Agency may represent the correct lever to 
re-introduce a securitized instrument in the market. The financial support of 
Governments (in the payment of part, or the totality, of fixed expenses and 
origination fees in periods of financial distress) may stimulate the development of the 
instrument by reassuring investors on its quality. Governments may even directly 
purchase P-CBOs, as a means of subsidizing at once a pool of diverse SMEs. 
Anyhow, as reported by the European Investment Fund (2011), the securitization 
market for European SMEs, after years of strong development, has almost 
disappeared as a result of the recent financial crisis. Most of the traditional structured 
product were normally present in this market, but the fact that they practically 
disappeared after the crisis implies that none of them was actually able to support 
SMEs’ funding in the moment they needed it most. This market will regain volume, 
and become again a useful tool to support SMEs financing needs, only if investors 
rebuild their confidence in the instrument itself and in the safety of the market, and if 
their position is supported by the existence of a sufficiently liquid secondary market. 
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This process will take time, but in this direction goes the effort of global institutions 
to establish a clear and reliable regulatory framework, in the attempt of increasing 
the stability and transparency of structured finance operations. In the proposals of 
Basel III, the provisions of a mandatory additional disclosure of information, of an 
ongoing rigorous assessment of each market member’s position, and of the creation 
of unified databases are clear steps towards the recreation of a solid ground for 
financial operations. Creating a European SMEs Rating Agency, as well as 
introducing a product similar to the Korean P-CBOs, would help injecting new 
lifeblood in the struggling SMEs debt market. 
5.3 Equity and Crowdfunding 
As reported by a recent study by Caccavaio, Carmassi, Di Giorgio and Spallone 
(2012), only 7% of European SMEs accessed equity financing in 2011, and the 
smallest percentages are reported in those countries where small businesses are more 
present (as Spain, Italy and Portugal). Listing on a stock market is one of the 
solutions identified by literature to raise small firms’ transparency and visibility in 
the market. Regulators responded with the creation of ad-hoc stock markets, reducing 
the high fixed costs and strict listing requirements which always kept SMEs away 
from going public. Still, except for those countries historically characterized by a 
strong presence of institutional investors (US and UK), SMEs listing has not yet 
gained consensus among small entrepreneurs.  
The objective of any regulatory change or creation of new instruments is eventually 
to expand the public of potential investors in small businesses. There is currently a 
big debate in the US, among practitioners and regulators, about the opportunity of 
institutionalizing crowdfunding as a means for SMEs to raise equity capital. In a 
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period in which banks reduced capital supply to SMEs, crowd-lending from non-
bank institutions globally gained increasing attention. Up to today, this tool has been 
used mainly in the form of donations or, at the most, of debt. In the EU, instead, it is 
possible to find a few examples (UK above all) of equity crowdfunding. In April 
2012, the US Congress approved the so-called “JOBS Act”, which reduces the 
regulatory burden for SMEs in the process of obtaining financing. According to this 
Act, each individual may participate in public capital placements on registered on-
line “funding portals”, avoiding the rigid requirements on public offerings imposed 
by the SEC. If the concepts underlined by this legislation are exported in other 
regulatory environments, this simple and direct instrument, which uses internet as a 
common platform for individual investors to make arbitrary funding contributions to 
an entity in quest for capital, may soon play an important role in SMEs financing.  
The benefits of crowdfunding are evident, as well as the drawbacks. At the expense 
of being obliged to reveal its innovative business idea, given that the platforms do 
not guarantee any scheme to protect intellectual property, each company can access a 
potentially immense crowd of investors. On the other hand, being forced to expose 
the business to the magnifying glass of the public of investors gives small firms a 
great tool to reduce their informational opacity. These particular deserving ideas, 
which might not fit the requirements for traditional financing, are then allowed to 
receive capital directly from future potential customers, which may act as catalyzers 
to bring in new investors. The creation of firm advocates may use word of mouth and 
social media to help the company grow and gain its place in the market. Critics say 
that single investors may be exposed to inadequate investments to their risk profile 
and knowledge, and that frauds are just behind the corner. While this may be true, 
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well-regulated platforms, with third-party evaluations and a system of quality 
feedbacks, would guarantee the safety of the operation. Then, the market would 
eliminate bad ideas, and support the good ones. In the framework of Berger and 
Udell (1998), this instrument may fit perfectly as complement to angel financing in 
the early stages of a SME’s growth cycle. Given that few are those “philanthropists” 
willing to invest huge amounts of money in small businesses, crowdfunding may 
represent the future for spurring public equity investments in SMEs. 
6. Conclusion 
According to a study by the European Commission published in 2007, the share of 
SMEs in national economies in higher in Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal than in 
the rest of Europe. While it would be an interesting research question to understand if 
the dominant presence of SMEs in an economy is somehow correlated with the 
causes of a crisis, it is worth to note that these are the countries where the current 
economic downturn is yielding its strongest effects. Finding ways to support SMEs 
may be the key to help national economies survive financial turmoils. This study, 
appreciating the developments in the regulatory settings proposed by the New Basel 
Accord, underlines that there is fertile ground for the creation of new instruments to 
fill the gap between SMEs financing needs and current capital supply shortages. 
Establishing a light rating for SMEs as a prerequisite for accessing public funding 
would dramatically reduce the high informational opacity afflicting those businesses. 
The development of a market for SMEs corporate bonds, as well as the creation of 
safe on-line crowdfunding platforms, could definitely widen the portfolio of 
instruments to access whenever bank loans, still the most widely financing tool used, 
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are not available. At last, Governments may have an important role in supporting 
SMEs by covering fixed expenses, especially in the hearth of a crisis. 
 
Bibliography 
Ayadi, R. (2005) The New Basel Capital Accord and SME Financing: SMEs and the 
New Rating Culture, CEPS Reports in Finance and Banking no. 36. 
Berger, A.N. and Udell G.F. (1998), The economics of small business finance: The 
roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 22, 613-673. 
Berger, A.N. and Udell G.F. (2003), Small Business and Debt finance, Handbook of 
Entrepreneurship Research, 13, 299-328. 
Berger, A.N. and Udell G.F. (2005), A More Complete Conceptual Framework for 
Financing of Small and Medium Enterprises, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper no.3795. 
Blundell-Wignall, A. and Atkinson, P. (2010) Thinking Beyond Basel III: Necessary 
Solutions for Capital and Liquidity, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends. 
Bruhn-Leon, B. and Eriksson, P-E and Kraemer-Els, H. (2012), Progress for 
Microfinance in Europe, European Investment Fund Working Paper no. 13. 
Caccavaio, M. and Carmassi, J. and Di Giorgio, G. and Spallone, M. (2012) SMEs 
and the Challenge of Going Public: Evidence from a Recent Survey, CASMEF 
Working Paper no.2. 
Cook, O. and Tang, T. (2010) Macroeconomic Conditions and Capital Structure 
Adjustment Speed, Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 16(1), 73-87. 
Dolignon, C. and Roger, F. (2010) Transmission of Financial Shocks to The Real 
Economy: The Impact of The Financial Accelerator, Working Paper Amundi no.4 
European Central Bank (2007), Corporate Finance in the Euro Area – Including 
Background Material, ECB Occasional Paper no. 63. 
European Central Bank (2012), The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey. 
27 
 
European Commission (2008), Think Small First: A Small Business Act for Europe. 
European Commission (2011a), Review of the Small Business Act for Europe. 
European Commission (2011b), Minimizing Regulatory Burden For SMEs: Adapting 
EU Regulation to the needs of micro-enterprises. 
Faulkender, M. and Petersen, M.A. (2005), Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital 
Structure?, The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 19(1), 45-79. 
Frank, M.Z. and Goyal, V.K. (2009), Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are 
Reliably Important?, Financial Management, Financial Management Association 
International, vol. 38(1), 1-37. 
Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, S. (1991) Monetary Policy, Business Cycles and the 
Behavior of Small Manufacturing Firms, NBER Working Paper no.3892 
Graham, J.R. and Leary, M.T. (2011), A Review of Empirical Capital Structure 
Research and Directions for the Future, Annual Review of Financial Economics, vol. 
3, 511-533. 
Hackbarth, D. and Miao, J. and Morellec, E. (2006) Capital Structure, Credit Risk 
and Macroeconomic Conditions, Journal of Financial Economics 82, 519-550. 
International Finance Corporation (2010), The SME Banking Knowledge Guide, 2nd 
edition, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
IFC and McKinsey & Company (2010), Two trillion and counting: Assessing and 
Mapping the Gap in Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Finance. 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling W.H. (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, vol.3, no. 
4, 305-360 
Kelly, R. and Kraemer-Els, H. (2011), European Small Business Finance Outlook, 
European Investment Fund Working Paper no. 10. 
Myers, S.C. and Majluf, N.S. (1984) Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, NBER Working Paper 
no. 1396 
Park, JH and Lim, BC and Koo, JH (2008), Developing the Capital Market to Widen 
and Diversify SME Financing: The Korean Experience, Korea Institute of Finance. 
